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Abstract 
In spite of the general consensus concerning the effectiveness of regional 
organizations in enabling democracy consolidation, there remain concerns about 
single international organizations facilitating democracy. Those who doubt the 
effectiveness of a single international organization's intervention believe that it is a 
burden due to the cost and expertise that is required. This paper tests the usefulness of 
a joint operation between regional and world organizations compared to a single 
regional and a single world organization. Three case studies, on Peru (1992), 
Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991), suggest that the OASNN joint mission in Haiti 
increased the level of democracy the most according to the Polity score. 
I. Introduction 
It is evident from the works by scholars such as Pevehouse and Mansfield 
that regional organizations are relatively more effective than world organizations in 
implementing and consolidating democracy. However, while there are thorough 
studies on regional and world organizations, in-depth research on joint international 
organization practice is lacking. On January 30, 1995, Resolution 975 favoring 
positive outcomes in Haiti was agreed to by the UN Security Council. The Resolution 
described the joint venture of the OAS and the UN in their International Civil Mission 
to Haiti OASAJN (MICIVIH) as valuable and acknowledged its importance in 
developing a favorable environment in Haiti. The UN Secretary General emphasized 
to "bear in mind the expertise and potential of the OAS, consult with the Secretary 
Genera1 of the OAS regarding other appropriate measures which might be taken by 
both organizations consistent with this resolution."' The recent joint forum by the UN 
and the OAS held in Mexico in October 2010 supports this trend in recognizing the 
importance of cooperation between these international organizations. 
Cooperation between the organizations is increasingly desired as the issues 
have become complicated and require mixed sets of expertise and skills. For 
example, it is now evident that democracy consolidation cannot be solved through 
political intervention alone but that societal and cultural change is also required. This 
raises the cost and expertise required by the international organizations to deal with 
' Berenson, William M. 1996. Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti: The 
Organization of American States and United Nations Experience: 1991 - 1995. OAS.org. 
http://www.oas.org/legal/english/ DUKEREV.doc (accessed November 21, 2010). 27 
the issue. The rising costs and requirements for more complex knowledge to solve this 
issue has become a burden to some international organizations that do not have the 
necessary experience or are not funded well. Therefore, it is now important to seek 
cooperation between different types of international organizations to secure more 
effective democracy consolidation. 
For this reason, this study discusses the effectiveness of joint operations by 
international organizations. It argues that when regional organizations and world 
organizations cooperate, there is a greater possibility to increase the level of 
democracy in a country than when an international organization works alone. This 
paper focuses on the joint operation between regional organizations and world 
organizations and its effectiveness in democracy consolidation, especially in Latin 
America. The paper is structured in seven parts. First, the literature review examines 
scholars' views of international organizations and their capability in democracy 
consolidation. Then, I define democracy in this paper. Third, three independent 
variables are explained. After defining regional organizations, world organizations, 
and the joint operation between the two, I move on to three case studies: Peru (1992), 
Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991). In the fifth part, I discuss the effectiveness of the 
joint form of international organizations between the UN and the OAS, before 
concluding. I am expecting to earn support for the argument that joint operations can 
be an effective tool in promoting democracy consolidation. 
11. Literature Review 
Many efforts to discover a reason for the consolidation of democracy range 
from the internal and external political environment, multilateral institutions, to 
individuals. However, most widely studied is the effect of economic development on 
democracy consolidation. Like Lipset and ~ r i s t o l e ~ ,  there are groups of scholars who 
argue that the increase in economic development has a positive impact on democracy. 
There are also scholars such as ~ a r r o , ~  who claim that when a country reaches a 
certain level of economic development, its influence on democracy terminates. 
However, still other scholars, such as   eve house,^ argue that regional 
organizations are effective in aiding democratic consolidation. This is because such 
organizations can influence the behavior of major domestic actors in regime change 
such as military elites and business actors, especially due to their uncertainty about 
regime change. These actors believe that the new regime can defend their interests 
and therefore they support the regime change. Regional organizations are capable of 
protecting an already existing regime, yet at the same time they are most prone to act 
against it. Also, "homogenous" organizations are more capable of pressuring non- 
democratic or democracy consolidating countries to catalyze the process because 
democratic countries tend to have higher expectations in accepting a member. In 
addition, Pevehouse suggests that if a country does not succeed in democracy 
Barro, Robert J.. 1999. Determinants of Democracy. The Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 107, No. 
6, Part 2. S182 
' Barro, 158-9. 
Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization. 
Cambridge University Press: United Kingdom 
consolidation, then there is a chance of the country collapsing. Therefore, the process 
relates to a country's "surviva~."~ 
pevehouse6 argues that regional organizations need to be most examined. 
This is because Pevehouse believes that regional organizations are the most often 
found organizations in the international system and that this allows researchers to find 
unique results. He also earns support from Whitehead's comment that a regional 
organization is more capable in defining clear results. Therefore, Pevehouse 
especially tests the effectiveness of domestic actors joining regional organizations. 
This idea is also supported by the study from Mansfield and Pevehouse, who believe 
that democratic consolidation accelerates when a country becomes a member of an 
international organization. As they explain, a state that is under democratization tends 
to join international ~r~anizat ions.~ By obtaining membership in an international 
organization, a state is able to gain information about democracy and earn prestige in 
international society. 
It is widely believed in international organizations theory that membership in 
international organizations can bring democracy consolidation. This is because most 
scholars, including  eveh house,' argue that a "homogenous" organization, an 
international organization that is constituted with highly democratic states, are more 
likely to pressure non-democratic states or states in the transition to democracy. 
Although democracy in Latin America has improved in the last few decades, 
democracy is still fragile in some parts of Latin American countries. Thus, it is 
Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, 29 
' Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and 
Democratization. International Organization Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer):520 
' Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International Organizations. 
International Organization Vol. 60 No. I (Winter): 145 
Pevehouse, Democracy from Above 47 
difficult to expect for Latin American regional organizations to consolidate 
democracy to the level that the world organizations might anticipate. 
In addition, Levitsky and way9 argue that more interactions with democratic 
countries beyond the region, especially with the West, encourage a state to 
democratize. Regional organizations are more prone to have higher concentrations of 
members and power to address an issue when they have similar interests. However, 
when an international organization lacks democratically mature states, it is difficult 
for the democratizing states to earn information or prestige. On the other hand, world 
organizations such as the United Nations have sometimes had difficulty in 
implementing activities because the member states have various interests. 
Nevertheless, world organizations can sometimes be more effective institutions in 
actively engaging in democratization and elevating the level of democracy because 
they are more likely to have a larger number of democratized countries. In order to 
support this argument, casc studies will follow. 
In addition, this study tries to further the scope of international organizations' 
effects from regional organizations to world organizations. This is because many 
studies in evaluating the effect of international organizations in Latin America are 
highly focused on regional organizations. A concentration on regional organizations 
can be understood in the context of the positive theoretical evaluation outlined above: 
the regional organizations function more easily as a tool to democratize a country. If 
this argument proves to have support, then joint operations by international 
organizations with similar objectives could be encouraged so as to further consolidate 
democracy in the region. 
9 Levitsky, Steven, Lucan A. Way. 2005. International Linkage and Democratization. Journal of 
Democracy 16.3: 20-34 
Therefore, this study also tries to support the budding cooperation between 
the OAS, whose main objective is to promote democracy in the Latin American 
region, and the UN, a world organization that commits its efforts to better living 
conditions, which relates to democracy. In the next part, I will discuss how different 
scholars define democracy. 
111. Measuring Democracy 
This study analyzes how different types of international organizations affect 
the level of democracy in each case. The level of democracy, therefore, is the 
dependent variable. In this study, 1 use Huntington's definition of democracy; he 
describes democracy as the system in which the "most powerful collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates 
freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
vote."1•‹ Democratization is a "transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes 
that occur within a specified period of time."" 
Most countries in Latin America, except for Cuba (which received -7 on the 
2007 Polity Score) and Venezuela (which dropped drastically from 5 in 2007 to -4 in 
200912), are considered fairly democratic. According to the Polity scale, the 
democracy level in the region increased from 0.30 (1981), to 2.74 (1985), to 6.96 
(2001) showing general growth. The "region mean state fragility index score" by the 
Center for Systemic Peace shows it dropped from approximately 10 in 1995 to 6.65 in 
2009.13 Also, research by the Polity IV Project records Latin America's fragility index 
of 2009 as very stable in most of the countries, except for Ecuador, Colombia and 
l o  Huntington, Samuel P.. 1991. The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 7 
I '  Huntington, 15 
12 Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State 
Fragility. Center for Systemic Peace 
I'  Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State 
Fragility. Center for Systemic Peace. http:Nwww.systemicpeace.org/CTfig19.htm(accessed October 18, 
20 1 0) 
The fragility index scores from 25 to 0 dividing levels of fragility into six indexes. Little or no fragility 
scores from 0 to 3, low is from 4 to 7, moderate scores from 8 to I I ,  serious is from 12 to 15, high 
ranges between 16 and 19, and extreme is from 20 to 25. 
Mexico in 2009 for drug t r a f f i~k in~ ; '~  most countries scored moderate, low, little or 
no sudden political or violent incidents. However, it is dubious to conclude that the 
region is under democratization or consolidation of democracy by only looking at this 
result alone because this score is focused on states' stability. For this reason, an 
examination of democratic consolidation should not only include the political system 
but also the level of infrastructure, freedom, and human rights. 
As the democracy level is the dependent variable of this study, I will use the 
Polity IV ~roject'' and political and civil rights indexes from Freedom ~ o u s e ' ~  to 
measure the democracy level of countries in the region. The Polity score considers 
that autocracy and democracy can exist simultaneously and this uniqueness allows us 
to measure the level of democracy more easily of those countries in a transition period. 
The Polity Score varies from -10 to 10 and divides these numbers into three 
regime types. From -10 to -6 is categorized as authoritarian, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and 
6 to 10 as democracies. In addition, numeric values are considered because this study 
tries to analyze different democratic levels. However, relying only on the Polity Score 
has limitations because the Polity Score highly focuses on political system change. It 
has limitations in clearly distinguishing since most Latk American countries are in 
the range of the democracy index in the 2007 Polity score. Also, the reason for relying 
on the Polity score is that recent international organizations not only focused on 
political infrastructure as one of the requirements for democracy but also included the 
domestic political environment, such as the level of respect for human rights, as one 
l 4  Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 5-6 
l 5  Polity I V  Project. 2010. Polity IV Project: political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2008. 
Political Instability Task Force(P1TF). http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed May 
27, 2010) 
I6 Freedom House. 2008. Washington D.C.. Freedom House. httn:llwww.freedomhouse.ord 
template.cfm?pa~e=35 I &ana ~aee=342&year=2008 (accessed May 27,2010) 
of the important conditions for democracy. Therefore, I will also compare the study 
with the Freedom House index. 
Another reason for selecting this method is because the Freedom House 
provides an index from the early 1970s, which matches the beginning phase of the 
third wave in Latin America. Furthermore, the Freedom House index measures 
democracy with two separate indices, political rights and civil liberties; the former 
includes rights such as electoral rights and the latter reviews other rights given to 
people in a country. 
The Freedom House index follows three divisions: "free", "partly free", and 
"not free". Freedom House categorizes full democracy using index scores one (1) and 
two (2) and labels it as "free"; from levels three (3) to five (5) a country is labeled 
"partly free"; and levels six (6) and seven (7) as "not free". This paper will use these 
numeric scores (from one to seven) to measure democracy. The reason for using the 
one to seven indicators in measuring democracy is that it allows more variance in 
testing the hypothesis. According to the Freedom House model, one (I)  is the most 
democratic, the most "free" borrowing the Freedom House term, and seven (7) is the 
most authoritarian, the most "not free" democratic regime also using the Freedom 
House terminology.'7 
It is expected that measuring both the Polity score and the Freedom House 
score will allow us to better assess the level of democracy in Latin America. 
17 Freedom House. 2008. Washington D.C.. Freedom House. httn://www.freedomhouse.ord 
temvlate.cfm?~age=35 I&ana va~e=342&vear=2008 (accessed May 27,2010) 
IV. Independent Variables 
This paper examines the effects of different types of international 
organizations and whether they can contribute to democracy consolidation, especially 
in the Latin American region. Accordingly, the independent variables are a 
combination of an intervention by a single international organization and a joint 
international organizations operation. To examine the efficiency of these international 
organizations in democracy consolidation, I will study three types of international 
organizations: world organizations, regional organizations, and joint organizations. 
International organizations are described by Pevehouse as "formal 
institutional bodies with nation-states as decision-making  member^."'^ The definition 
of an international organization which Marshall, Marshall, and Young provide is more 
detailed than other descriptions; they are "autonomous international governmental.. . 
organizations of a non-profit nature. Multinational enterprises are therefore excluded. 
All such bodies have members in at least 3 countries and do not have their activities 
or decision-making structured in favour of any particular country."19 
Mansfield and Pevehouse put emphasis on its functions, unlike other 
definitions that focus on membership and structure. They define it as "associations 
established by governments or their representatives that are sufficiently 
institutionalized to require regular meetings, rules governing decision making, a 
l 8  Pevehouse Jon C.. With a little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the 
Consolidation of Democracy. American Journal of Political Science Vol. 46 No. 3: 61 1 
I y  Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 1999. Membership in 
Conventional International Organizations 1952 - 1997. Center for Systemic Peace. 3 
permanent staff, and a headquarters."20 
Along with the definition for international organizations, I will follow 
Marshall, Marshall, and ~ o u n ~ ' s ~ '  description from the "Membership in 
Conventional International Organizations 1952 - 1997" to measure regional 
organizations. They define regional organizations while categorizing them as 
"intercontinental membership organizations"22 as "includ[ing] all international non- 
profit organizations.. . whose membership and preoccupations exceed that of a 
particular continental region, although not to a degree justifying its inclusion in the 
previous type."23 Among the regional organizations in the Latin American region, I 
will use the intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS) on the self - 
coup caused by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in the early 1990s and in the early 
2000s. 
Next, I will use the definition from the same source for world organizations. 
They describe the world organizations, or the universal membership organizations, as 
including "all non-profit international organizations.. . that have a widespread, 
geographically-balanced membership, management and policy-control. Although this 
concept of a 'universal' membership organization is much discussed, no generally 
accepted rule for distinguishing such bodies has been formulated. The rule applied 
here is that there should be members in at least 60 countries, or else in more than 30 
countries provided that the distribution between continents is 'well-ba~anced."'~~ 
Accordingly, the United Nations will be used as a case study for the world 
'" Mansfield, and Pevehouse. 138 
21 Marshall, Monty G.,  Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 
22 Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3 
2 h a r s h a l l ,  Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3 
24 Marshall, Monty G.,  Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 4 
organizations since it is one of the largest and one of the most well functioning world 
organizations. As for the case study, the autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano in 1993 
will be studied. In the case of Guatemala, the UN interference was not caused by the 
action of President Serrano but by Guatemala's long lasting domestic instability. 
However, this case study was selected because the initial concern for intervention, 
human rights and restoring democracy, was similar to the other case studies. 
Lastly, the collective action form of these two types of organizations will be 
defined as joint organizations. The organizations referred to in this part of the paper 
are the OAS and the UN. The study will focus on the chain of missions exercised in 
Haiti from 199 1 through 1995. 
These three case studies were selected because the first two cases, Peru (1 992) 
and Guatemala (1993), concerned domestic insecurity caused by the self - coup by 
the president and both the OAS and the UN reacted to these issues. Although the case 
study of Haiti (1991) is not caused by an autogolpe, it was selected because it was 
caused by a coup d'etat and it is one of the first joint missions that was adopted in 
Latin America. 
Before I move on to the case studies, I will discuss three types of 
international organizations in order to understand their characteristics in more detail. 
V. International Organizations 
A lot of studies on the effects of international organizations on democracy 
consolidation focus on states' membership in international organizations rather than 
how these institutions function to consolidate democracy. Although there may be a 
basic set protocol within each institution regarding how to deal with democracy 
backtracking issues, each instance varies greatly and it is difficult to theorize the issue. 
In this section I will describe the strengths and weaknesses of joining each type of 
international organizations. Former United Nations Secretary - General Boutros 
Boutros - ~ h a l i ~ ~  also recognized this issue and was concerned that the United 
Nations democracy consolidation efforts should not be determined with one sweeping 
policy. 
Therefore I will start by explaining the functions of the international 
organizations compared to regional organizations and world organizations to discover 
which type of international organizations have superior influence in consolidating 
democracy in the Latin American region. Thus, I will begin with a description of the 
general characteristics of the international organizations and move on to the 
distinctive features of the regional organizations and the world organizations. As the 
joint international organizations operation is a combination of the previous two types 
of international organizations, it will not be substantially discussed. Followed by the 
characteristics, I will move on to functional practices that these international 
organizations perform to consolidate democracy. 
'' Adams, Francis. 2003. Deepening Democracy: Global Governance and Political Reform in Latin 
America. Westport: Praeger Publishers 
As explained earlier, Mansfield and  eveh house^^ researched what causes 
states to participate in each type of international organization. The distinctive nature 
of international organizations varies according to the requirements that the states may 
need to meet to join them. Some of them vary from requiring no changes in order to 
become a member in organizations like the United Nations, to grand economic and 
political changes needed for membership in organizations such as the European Union. 
Both regional and world organizations fall under "political organizations"27 because, 
generally, these types of organizations do not have particular aims that are desired 
from the member countries.28 
Unfortunately, differentiating regional and world organizations is difficult 
when these both fall under the same category. Also, a clear distinction between both 
organizations is difficult when scholars ambiguously define international 
organizations. They share characteristics of international organizations. For example, 
although Pevehouse focuses on the regional organizations in the book Democracy 
from Above, it is difficult to understand the separation between the two organizations. 
That having been said, regional and world organizations may show similar 
bshavior when they require the member states to maintain their status as democratic 
states or consolidate their democracy levels. The international organizations, both 
regional and world, can urge the member state that is backtracking from its process to 
consolidate democracy through political (diplomatic) and economic pressure. Doing 
so can have positive effects, especially on newly recognized democracies and those 
that are in the positive process of consolidation. Pressuring the states that fail to 
*' Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. Democratization and the Varieties of International 
Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 52.269-294 
27 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008.52.274 
28 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 272-4 
consolidate democracy can differentiate pressuring states from those of failing ones 
and can elevate one's standing in international organizations.29 
Also, the pressure by the democratic countries to backtracking countries not 
only drives member countries from an international organization's dedication to 
proliferate democracy, but also widens their trade and political partners. This is 
because of the general understanding that democracy has positive political and 
economic effects and these countries are highly favorable to economic relationships in 
both private and public sectors with international partners.30 These attributes of 
international organizations catalyze the member states in international organizations 
to propagate democracy both within the international organizations and outside as 
well. 
Moreover, another important factor is that states join certain international 
organizations to show their commitment to introduce or strengthen democracy 
domestically. Showing a commitment though joining international organizations can 
give the impression to domestic actors that the government has the strong will to 
consolidate democracy. This intention can be seen through domestic reforms of 
government systems, electoral processes, and human rights.3' The cost of changing 
the domestic rules are high and sometimes the government has to deal with the 
domestic elites in contrary positions, especially of those in business and the military.32 
Therefore, it is generally thought that the pressure democratizing states or 
states that are under a process of consolidating democracy comes from a membership 
requirement that international organizations ask for when joining them. This is 
29 Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? 523 
'" Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? 523 
j' Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above 
32 Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above 
because after meeting the condition, especially those states which have a high 
commitment to consolidate democracy or democratization do not attempt to go 
against the process. 
However, the most distinctive difference between the regional and world 
organizations is how much the members states' voice can influence the organization. 
As the regional organizations tend to have fewer members due to their geographical 
limits, small or less powerful countries have a higher chance to be opinionated. 
Pevehouse also writes that the "forum provides states of all sizes with a low-cost 
'voice' opportunity."33 
Furthermore, these international organizations have a systematic similarity in 
helping countries to consolidate democracy. Especially in this part of the paper, I 
focus on two international organizations, the OAS and the UN, because the case 
studies undertaken later focus on these two organizations. It is interesting that 
democracy promotion in both the UN and the OAS stem from human rights protection. 
It is not surprising that the UN is concerned about human rights; however, it is odd to 
see the OAS initiatives for protecting human rights in the region. This is because 
recently the OAS is widely understood as a democracy proliferating organization in 
the region than protecting human rights; still, the organization began to concentrate on 
democracy consolidation after 1985 at the General Assembly Meeting in ~ a r t a ~ e n a ~ ~  
where "delegates to this session amended the preamble of the OAS charter [Article 2 
of the Chapter I] to state that 'representative democracy is an indispensable condition 
for the stability, peace and development of the region."'35 
'' Pevehouse Jon C .  2002. Democracy from the Outside-In523 
34 Adams,. 88 
" Adams. 88 
Nonetheless, these organizations initiated democracy promotion from human 
rights concerns. They also share similar functional mechanisms. Three functional 
similarities can be found between the OAS and the UN: electoral support, help for 
local governments to build institutional systems, and sharing inf~rmation.~~ 
The highest objective of supporting electoral systems is to encourage 
countries to have periodic and fair elections. This assistance can range from building 
institutional infrastructure to generating "civil registries"37 through monitoring and 
education. For example, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) is organized under 
the Department of Political Affairs in the UN to assist states that are in need of 
planning clean and fair elections.38 The second objective is to help central and local 
governments build basic institutional systems to strengthen the local governments and 
decentralize from the central governments.39 Decentralization from the central 
governments is also associated with consolidating democracy because it can reduce 
the ability of a dominant leader monopolizing the country as autocratic governments 
do. Compared to the central government, local governments lack knowledge of 
maintaining resources and finance. More importantly, these organizations help local 
governments to strengthen legislative systems by offering expertise in endorsing 
legislation and developing local policies.40 Lastly, the organizations facilitate as an 
information sharing site for transparent government. However, while the UN collects 
information on government functions and its ability to support the domestic system, 
Adams, 49,97 
" Adams, 97 
'' Adams, 49.97 
" Adams, 52,98 
40 Adams, 52,98 
the OAS focuses its data collection efforts on democracy proliferation.4' 
In the next part of the paper I will discuss three case studies in which, 
respectively, the OAS, UN, and a joint UNIOAS mission intervened in Latin 
American countries. 
4 '  Adams, 54,99 
18 
VI. Case Studies 
A. The OAS: Peru in 1992 
I begin the case studies of the two organizations with the role of the OAS in 
Peru during the Fujimori government from 1990 to 2000. The initial phase of 
democratization was driven in the late 1970s by the military. This is because the 
military regime was incapable of resolving the economic crisis and the divided 
military understandings. Additional processes such as elections to return the country 
to civilian rule were taken between 1977 and 1980, with financial relief from foreign 
countries to some of the parties in ~ e r u . ~ ~  By the 1980s, Peru had democratized. 
In 1990 Alberto Fujimori was elected. He became a beloved figure in the 
country and America for his efforts in dealing with the Shining Path and in settling the 
economic crisis even as he was also suspect because of his political attitude toward 
human rights.43 TWO years after the election, on April 5 1992, President Fujimori 
announced Plan Verde with military assistance. This plan resulted in limiting 
Congress, banning the constitution, dismissing the judiciary, and suspending the 
media. Plan Verde was ~II outline from Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's self - coup 
advisor, which gave emergency authority to the president when necessary.44 
This action taken by Fujimori was especially welcomed by military and 
42 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 2006. Intervention without Intervening? The OAS Defense and 
Promotion of Democracy in the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan.45-9 
41 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 49 
44 Cameron, Maxwell A,. 1998. Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia. Journal ofDemocmcy. 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 126 
business actors who had lost faith in democracy after the economy had worsened4'. 
Two estimations about Fujimori's self - coup can be discussed. One is that Fujimori 
had concerns over the economic crisis in Peru and these worries caused him to control 
the legislative system. Another analysis, which is more believed by scholars, is that he 
was obsessed with maintaining the Fujimori's behavior was condemned 
by many countries such as the United States. However, while controversial, elections 
that took place in 1995 were assessed by scholars such as ~ e v i t s k ~ ~  and Arceneaux 
and pion-~erlin~'  as Fujimori's regime going back to democracy. 
To the OAS, Peru was one of the first interventions for democratization in the 
early 1990s.~' Soon after the self - coup, the Permanent Council issued Resolution 
579, stating that Fujimori had violated Resolution 1080, and decided to hold an 
immediate ad hoc meeting. The meeting held in November agreed to send a "high - 
level fact finding mission."50 They also agreed to elect a group - called the 
Democratic Constitutional Congress - and observe them write a new Constitution that 
would serve until the new presidential election of 1995.'' 
Although the OAS made progress on gaining consent from Fujimori to hold a 
legislative election in 1995, the institution was also marked by its lack of consensus 
and its feeble monitoring mission. Members such as the United States on the one hand 
and Mexico - Brazil on the other had the most conflicting suggestions. Countries had 
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different perspectives on the strength of the reaction towards the self - coup.S2 Further, 
uncertainty about the mission's effectiveness had risen when the observer missions to 
two 1995 elections were unsuccessful. The elections were questioned in their 
transparency. In one of the elections, the national election, almost 6,000 ballots 
perished. Nearly forty percent of the ballots were abrogated during the legislative 
ele~tion.'~ Failings of the monitoring body were critical because they were present at 
the country with a visit arranged by President Fujimori himself. 
Unlike what the OAS expected, the organization was not able to make 
significant progress as the public popularity of Fujimori grew. Even if the OAS did 
not make much progress with the autogolpe in the early 1990s, it demonstrated 
continuous influence in some parts of the electoral system. Enacted by the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), the club created an education system for the observer 
group called the " ~ r a n s ~ a r e n c i a " ~ ~  in the mid 1990s and this group served for the 
2000 presidential election. This observer body constituted of civilians was to support 
democratic election: the system was established for transparent vote counting.55 
Since the 2000 election, the OAS and particularly the Unit for the Protection 
of Democracy, especially pursued by CCsar Gaviria , showed an effort "to expend an 
external validation power of the organization" to contribute in a more political 
manner.56 The organization passed its constitutional limits in challenging states' 
sovereignty and implemented a mission in Peru. This action taken by the OAS 
encouraged the institution to move further as a multilateral organization, according to 
52 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 52-3 
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Cooper and Legler, but they should not be satisfied with the success in Peru. They 
argue that although the organization was blessed in terms of its mission to Peru, the 
OAS still has flaws that need to be overcome, such as interfering with sovereignty and 
defining democracy within the 
As a result, the second OAS intervention in Peru was very successful, 
escalating the democracy level from -3 (1992) to 5 (2000), according to the Polity 
score. The Polity score reached 1 in 1995 when the OAS made great effort such as 
creating domestic observers, although it was not successful failing to meet 
transparency of the process, in supporting electoral process. The Freedom House 
score also shows a general increase of their democracy level. However, while the 
political rights score dropped from 6 (1992) to 3 (2000), the civil rights score only 
dropped two levels from 5 (1992) to 3 (2000). The results resemble the OAS 
emphasis on the electoral system during the intervention. 
57 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 62-4 
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B. United Nations: Guatemala in 1993 
A year after President Fujimori's self - coup, Guatemala also experienced an 
autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano. He decided to suspend Congress and the 
Supreme Court and to ban part of the Constitution. The self - coup in Guatemala is 
easily compared to that of Peru's because of its similarity in process.58 However, 
unlike the success of President Fujimori, President Serrano had to resign his 
presidency after nearly two years of his autocratic regime. One big difference between 
President Serrano's action from the autogolpe by President Fujimori is that the self - 
coup in 1993 did not receive severe counter action by international organizations, 
although some organizations did voice concerns. This may be because, during that 
time, there already had been UN interference in Guatemala to broker peace talks to 
end the civil war. The UN took an active role as a mediator to bring about a cease fire 
between the Guatemalan government and an opposition group. However, in 1995, the 
UN declared a humanitarian mission because it was concerned about the human rights 
violations occurring in Guatemala. 
Guatemala had long been in unrest due to the civil war with various 
opposition forces such as the ladino guerrillas, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), 
the Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (ORPA), and the Civil Self - 
defense Patrols (PACs). In 1984, when the military had mostly defeated the newly 
established National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unit (URNG), the country elected the 
58 Cameron, 130 
first civilian president and entered into a democratic t ran~it ion.~~ President Serrano, 
after he was elected in January 1991, began to reform the military structure. Many 
high military officers were dismissed and charged with crimes. Also, he initiated 
direct talks with the opposition forces. Despite President Serrano's achievements, he 
was accused of corruption60. President Serrano bought votes using secret funds called 
confidenciales, but eventually failed to buy the party's votes to his favor and declared 
an autogolpe on May 25, 1 993.61 However, President Serrano himself had dictatorial 
characteristic which encouraged him to declare self - However, the 
Guatemalan government, military, civilians, and the international organizations did 
not welcome the self - coup by President Serrano and eventually forced him to resign. 
The UN influence in Guatemala began before the autogolpe in 1993. As an 
active mediator, the UN helped peace talks to take place in 1990 between the 
government and the guerrillas. In 1991, several agreements for a cease - fire were 
reached in meetings such as the Mexico Accord in April, but the process was halted 
until 1994 because of the self - coup. The Guatemalan government and the opposition 
force (URNG) acknowledged each other's commitment to continue the peace 
negotiation in January 1 9 9 4 . ~ ~  By March, the two parties signed a Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights which led to the creation of the United Nations 
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Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINuGUA).~~ The MINUGUA was to support 
the peace - agreements as the accord added more details later as the agreements were 
finalized in December 1 9 9 6 . ~ ~  Mandates of the MINUGUA also included monitoring 
human rights issues, such as the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples that 
occurred because of the ethnic division in Guatemala. This incorporated the education 
of indigenous people and encouraged them to actively participate in the representative 
system. Also professional training was held to re - enter the rebels into society. In 
1996, a peace agreement was finalized by the Guatemalan government and the UNRG. 
An agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace included issues such as the cease - fire, 
demobilization, and no discrimination of opposition forces when they returned to 
society. The MINUGUA's task was to monitor and supervise the demobilization 
process, monitor human rights, and provide support for the rebuilding of the judicial 
system. 66 
Consequently, intervention by the UN in Guatemala made the least progress. 
Among three case studies, the UN was able to increase the least polity score level 
from 3 (1993) to 8 (2000). In addition, result from the UN intervention is not 
satisfying because escalation of democracy level appeared only once in 1996, when 
the peace agreement was signed, between the years from 1993 to 2000. In addition, 
there was no change in the democracy level after 1996. The Freedom House scores 
also did not make significant changes. The scores decreased by only one point from 4 
(political rights) and 5 (civil rights) in 1993. 
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C. Cooperative Form: The OAS-UN mission in Haiti in 1991 
This joint venture between the OAS and the UN will be elaborated in more 
detail because the purpose of this paper is to emphasize the effectiveness of 
international organizations working together. Gibsons concludes that the cooperation 
between the OAS and the United Nations was mostly shown in later phase of the 
intervention in Haiti. Berenson, on the other hand, argues that the cooperation 
between the two organizations was first led by the OAS, immediately after the coup 
d9Ctat, and was transferred to the UN in 1 9 9 3 . ~ ~  
Immediately after the coup d'Ctat, a lot of the reaction taken by the UN and 
the OAS focused on sanctions. The coup d'Ctat, led by General Michel FranFlois on 
September 29, 1991, overthrew President Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, who 
was elected seven months before, was exiled to the United States. The OAS held an 
ad hoc meeting in response to the coup d'ttat, which violated Resolution 1080. 
Decisions made on October 3, 1991 refused to recognize the new government and 
ceased all economic relations with Haiti, including humanitarian aid. A few days later, 
the UN came up with similar results about the organization's concerns about the 
violent activity in Haiti and urged the members to support the OAS to sanction the 
new regime. On June 16, 1993 after the UN failed to mediate the issue, the Security 
Council announced Resolution 841 to embargo all petrol and arms. Before this 
resolution, the UN took a relatively passive attitude toward the new regime, asking 
" Berenson, William M. 1996. Joint Venture for the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti: The 
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member states to participate in the sanctions voluntarily.68 However, Resolution 841 
was taken into account. This reaction, with the UN acting under the Chapter VII and 
VIII,~' was urging cooperation with the regional organization in order to mandatorily 
bind states to take action against the new government in Haiti. 
With the sanctions continuing to put pressure on Haiti, General Raoul Cedras 
was willing to meet President Aristide. From the meeting, the two parties agreed on 
the Governors Island Accord and the New York Pact, which included steps that should 
be taken until Aristide returned to the country and to his position as the president in 
October. The UN and the OAS, separately but on the same day, lifted the embargo to 
move toward restoring President Aristide back to his presidential position, although 
Cedras still did not allow Aristide back into ~ a i t i . ~ '  
In spite of all the other measures that took place, the sanctions against the 
military regime were reinstituted. This was because the Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) 
force failed to continue its plan due to domestic resistance. In May 6, 1994, mostly 
driven by the United States, a total sanction towards Haiti was voted on Resolution 
917 to increase pressure on the new regime.71 Although the agreement failed, this 
meeting called the UN and the OAS to step up together as coordinators of the meeting 
in New York to monitor and validate the process. In late September 1994, as the 
Multinational Force (MNF) entered and negotiations between General Cedras and the 
United States began, the embargo was suspended as the UN Security Council agreed 
Gibsons, Elizabeth D., 1999. Sanctions in Haiti: Human Rights and Democracy Under Assault. 
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on Resolution 948 and asked the OAS to do same.72 
As reactions by the UN and the OAS were highly focused on embargoes and 
sanctions, there were also doubts about the effectiveness of the economic pressure. 
The concern was especially about the economic effects on low income populations 
such as inflation and unemployment. Therefore, humanitarian concerns escalated as 
poor communities suffered from the sanctions.73 For this reason, the UN and the OAS 
agreed to create an International Civil Mission to Haiti OASAJN (MICIVIH) on May 
Before beginning the aid, the two organizations had conflicting arguments on 
defining humanitarian aid and whether discrimination of donors was acceptable. 
Some, such as the OAS and Dante Caputo, the UNIOAS special envoy, were 
distressed about the idea that the new regime in Haiti would misunderstand the 
purpose of the aid. Unfortunately, because the member states had different political 
interests, the UNJOAS Consolidated Humanitarian Plan for Haiti could only earn 19 
percent of its aimed donation ($62.7 million).74 
Despite the MICIVIH's obstacles in attracting funds and technical issues, 
cooperation was successful with regard to the quick response in Haiti. For example, 
while the UN was not able to deploy observers in Haiti soon enough, the OAS sent 
observers in advance to rent offices and build infrastructure to deal with the 
humanitarian issues. By 1994, the observer mission developed into supporting the 
education system, human rights issues, election efforts, and judicial development.75 
One of the missions the MICIVM requested was for the United Nations 
72 Berenson, 26 
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International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to protect child rights as a part 
of the project. However, from the beginning, UNICEF faced challenges due to the 
lack of knowledge about the region and the member states' political interests. 
Especially, the sanctions that followed discouraged the team from dispersing 
necessary goods and helping the most needy populations. Moreover the mission could 
not facilitate more than as an observer in ~ a i t i . ~ ~  The Secretary Council's Sanctions 
Committee-while its effectiveness is controversial-eventually arranged a 
humanitarian exemption. Later, recognition by the UNIOAS, the Pan American Health 
Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) supported with fuel 
delivery to donating organizations in the region and management in a collective 
effort.77 
The joint mission by the UN and the OAS was one of the first cooperative 
operations undertaken to defend democracy in Latin America. The mission is assessed 
as a partial success due to the lack of appropriate support from the military. As 
described earlier, the UNMIH force had to leave Haiti because of the domestic 
opposition during the mission. However, the project was successful in that the 
organizations set a precedent by committing an effort to consolidate democracy. 
The result for the UN - OAS joint operation is somewhat controversial. This 
is because the democracy level increased from -7 (1991) to -2 (2000) according to 
the Polity score but there were severe fluctuations. The democracy level jumped to 7 
in 1994, from -7 the previous year, which could be a result of the joint mission 
observers' support in educational system, human rights, electoral, and judicial 
development that began in 1994. However, the democracy level showed a big drop in 
76 Gibsons, 56-62 
77 Gibsons, 68-70 
2000 to -2 when tension grew in Haiti after the election. The Freedom House score 
displayed similar results about Haiti. Both scores had 7 in 1991 but the political rights 
score was able to only drop one point by 2000 while the civil rights score reached 5. 
Although the result of Haiti case is controversial because of the fluctuation, 
joint operations by the UN and OAS in Haiti increased the democracy level from an 
authoritarian regime to a democracy during the period of 1991 and 1998. In Peru, 
however, the OAS escalated democracy level from an anocratic regime to democracy. 
In addition, while the OAS mission to Peru elevated the democracy level by 
increasing its Polity score by 12 points, the joint OASIUN operation in Haiti advanced 
the Policy score by 14 points. 
VII. Effectiveness of cooperation by international organizations 
Joint operations can face challenges when the international organizations 
have different decision making systems. The dilemma can escalate when the 
organizations cannot agree on how to reach a goal. However, as seen in the Haitian 
case, this opinion gap can increase discussions on how these organizations can better 
support countries to reach democracy through consensus on methods and ultimate 
goals. Aside from the politics, the UN Charter puts the main focus on people as the 
main international actor. This idea brings the UN to promote democracy as the 
organization believes that democracy consolidation can promote better living 
standards for the people. Therefore, human rights become more important than 
increasing specific states' interest on the region. In addition, although the current OAS 
puts more emphasis on democracy consolidation, the organization was initiated to 
protect human rights. This fundamental idea of the two organizations provides good 
reason for them to cooperate in order to promote and help consolidate democracy. 
Collaboration between the UN and the OAS can help the United States to 
earn trust from the Latin Americans. Some of the Latin American countries still have 
concerns about the United States' intention in intervening in their region. This is 
because, so far, the region possesses a negative impression of the United States' past 
intervention during the Cold War in the region while promoting its own democratic 
The United States' commitments to democracy in Latin America were not 
consistent and were dependent on the United States' interest. In some cases the United 
'' Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 16 
States would support non - democratic regimes or an action taken by certain groups 
or individuals when it had critical links to the United States' security interest. In 1993, 
the United States actively engaged to counter the autogolpe effort made by the 
Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. However, a year before in Peru the United States 
did not counter President Alberto Fujimori's self - coup in 1 9 9 2 . ~ ~  Also, the fact that 
the United States has a large influence in the OAS deters the Latin Americans from 
taking guidance on democracy consolidation because it questions the motives of the 
United States. 
The fact that the United States is a permanent member of the UN adds to 
Latin America's concern on the effectiveness of the United States in the OAS. In 
addition, the permanent council does not have a regional power from the Latin 
American region to discuss the area's issues. However, as the importance of the UN 
stands on its symbolic image that may empower the member states' behavior, the UN 
Security Council can be an initiahve in beginning missions to the region and 
announce the organization's support.80 
Cooperation between the regional organizations and the world organizations 
can be compared to collaboration between domestic actors such as the publ' C sectors 
and local organizations. The relationship between these two actors can foster 
facilitating knowledge and resources. Therefore, these actors may seek for assistance 
simultaneously. On the one hand, the public organizations may request help from 
local organizations, non - government organization or non - profit organizations or 
civilian groups. On the other hand, local organizations may seek for relations with the 
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international organizations to earn support in financial and material resources that 
these local organizations may lack." Therefore, collaboration can support what other 
organizations lack, such as in information, technical knowledge, resources, and other 
possible assistance. 
Scholar such as ~e renson '~  believe that the OAS can be an active tool for the 
joint organizations project when the UN cannot be situated at the site fast enough. 
These differences lie under the different regulations and accessibilities these 
organizations have. When a country faces a democracy backlash, the OAS can take an 
immediate action through gathering an ad hoc meeting according to Resolution 1080. 
However, the decision making process in the UN may take longer than the OAS due 
to the interest distance between the participating countries. In addition, the OAS 
members have easier geographical accessibility compared to a multinational force 
from the UN. The joint mission to Haiti in the early 1990s is a good example of this. 
Before the UN observers arrived at the site, the OAS sent its observers, approximately 
100 observers, and prepared it with office and basic equipment. The UN, although it 
anived late at the site, committed with its expertise in the issue. 
The regional organizations and world organizations may have similar 
functional factors in assisting countries. However, because they are different in size, 
goals, and members that are affiliated in the system, their approach to the situations 
may differ according to the organization type. For example, on the one hand, the OAS 
focuses on strengthening and organizing national governments' legislature and 
judiciaries. On the other hand, the UN puts emphasis on "decentralizing 
Huxharn, Chris, Siv Vangen. 1996. Working Together Key Themes in the Management of 
Relationships between Public and Non -Profit Organizations. The International Journal of Public 
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governance"83 and increasing civilian participation.84 In addition, during the 
MICIVIH, the OAS and the UN had faced a contradiction in defining humanitarian 
aid. Such challenges can be overcome through accumulated joint practice. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Causes of democracy consolidation are discussed by various scholars in many 
different ways. Scholars such as Lipset and Aristotle believe that economic 
development will enhance the level of democracy. Nonetheless, there are others who 
argue that the democracy level will decrease when a country reaches a certain level of 
economic performance. Others who think that external factors can cause the 
democracy level to increase put emphasis on international organizations to account 
for democracy consolidation. Those who focus on using international organizations, 
such as Pevehouse, usually favor regional organizations. They think the world 
organizations' effectiveness in democracy consolidation is highly limited. They 
believe that the regional organizations are more capable in implementing democracy 
around the world and in Latin America. The power of regional organizations does not 
only lie in their geographical concentration but also the pressure they can put on other 
member states. This is because the regional organizations have smaller numbers of 
member states, and it is relatively efficient for thc group to act through consensus. 
On the other hand, the world organization can be an adequate tool when a 
country wants to earn a reputation because there are more members that can recognize 
others. Therefore, although a consensus is usually difficult to meet, when it is agreed 
by the member states, the impact is much larger than that of the regional organizations. 
The regional organizations and world organizations may have relatively 
strong factors toward each other such as pressuring other states to act or to recognize 
them certain way. However, each organization can also be supported in what they lack 
in these characteristics. In 1995, the UN recognized the effectiveness of the OAS. 
Therefore, the UN Secretary General included in Resolution 975 how the OAS can be 
supportive to the UN to secure democracy in Haiti. 
The cooperation between the organizations does not need to be bound by 
symbolic meaning that the joint mission can give to the international society. They 
can support each other through regulations and materials that each alone may lack. 
Therefore, a joint mission between the regional organizations and the world 
organizations can embrace better results than working alone. For example, on the one 
hand, during the mission to Haiti in 1991, the OAS was able to declare a Resolution 
before the UN could and condemn the military coup d'itat. The UN later announced 
its concern of the issue and joined the OAS by sanctioning the new regime. On the 
other hand, the OAS was assisted with the expertise and materials from the UN during 
the observer mission. 
There is a possibility that the separate mission to Haiti in 1991 could have 
eased the tension, bring the military regime down, and restored democracy. Also, the 
joint mission faced challenges because whenever a new decision was to be made, each 
organization had to adopt a new resolution of its own. However, as a joint miss:on, the 
UN and the OAS showed its collective and consistent support to restore democracy in 
Haiti and urged member states to participate in the sanctions and embargo. This 
coinciding joint action against the rough regime encouraged member states to 
participate and resulted in restoring Haiti to its pre - condition before the coup d'Ctat. 
The importance of cooperative action between the regional organizations and 
the world organizations should not be minimized. The OAS and the UN recognize 
their importance and have begun to hold forums to share information regarding this 
matter. In addition, the case studies showed that the Haiti mission was more 
successful in elevating the democracy level than the other two cases (Peru and 
Guatemala). This result supports the argument that joint operations can be efficient in 
implementing democracy consolidation. However, the joint operation failed to 
maintain democracy in Haiti when stability eroded in 2000. 
Therefore, a further challenge to this paper and to the cooperative form of 
international organizations is to discover what necessary conditions or processes are 
required for these joint operations to be most effectively implemented. Further, one 
might test whether the short stability in Haiti was due to the domestic conditions or to 
the limitations of joint operations. This can be researched from past joint practices by 
not only the OAS and the UN but other world organizations and regional 
organizations such as the European Union. 
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